INTRODUCTION
Since its establishment in 1959, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed into a constitutionalist actor within and beyond the continent of Europe; a development that is in no small part due to judicial innovations, such as evolutive interpretation. However, this development presents the Court with both an opportunity and a challenge. In terms of opportunity, it enables the Court to secure the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) as a meaningful and effective instrument for the protection of rights through innovative tools. Thus, the Convention, as applied by the Court, remains capable of responding to contemporary rights challenges across the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. More challenging, however, is the task of keeping these states on board as this development is taking place, because judicial innovation within the Court has led to claims that the Convention is being interpreted out of its original meaning so that the Court is illegitimately expanding it in substance and form to oblige states to do things far outside of the contemplation of the original framers and the literal meaning of the text. 1 Judicial innovation, especially that leading to the evolution of the Convention, has resulted in a tension between the Court and the contracting parties; a tension that we argue is addressed by the Court through its docket management, its cognisance of non-legal factors in particularly contentious cases, and its use of consensus-based interpretation. In essence, we argue, the patterns of activity discernible in the Court under these brackets can be read as developing a nascent model of judicial self-restraint by the Court. Although these are mechanisms by which the risks and tensions emerging from judicial innovation are managed, we do not claim that such management is cost free. Rather, we draw out a number of 1 The Contracting Parties have emphasised on a number occasions that the Court is a system of human rights protection which is subsidiary to the national system and then the Court should not go too far with innovations. As a result of this international pressure Protocol 15 will amend the preamble to the ECHR to include references to subsidiarity and margin of appreciation. See, Article 1 of Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. implications of this management for the Court in the eyes not only of contracting parties to the Convention but also of other important stakeholders such as rights-bearers and nongovernmental organisations (NGO) throughout Europe.
In this article we first explore the ways in which judicial innovation within the Court has led contracting parties to question its legitimacy, with possible negative implications for diffuse support (i.e. support for the institution rather than for particular decisions it may make). The potential costs of a loss of diffuse support are such that, we argue, some mechanisms of managing judicial innovation are critical and, indeed, are discernible in the jurisprudence of the Court. In this respect we then consider the ways in which the Court's docket management, cognisance of non-legal factors, and deployment of consensus decisionmaking can all be read as management mechanisms even though, as interviews undertaken with current and former judges of the Court suggest, the Court may not be consciously managing this tension thus. We then go on to consider the implications of this for the Court and most particularly for its jurisprudential development. Importantly, this article does not purport to question the legitimacy or desirability of judicial innovation (and especially evolution) per se in the Court. Rather we leave to one side these debates about judicial innovation (or activism, as it is sometimes called) 2 and instead simply classify such innovation as part of the Court's constitutionalist development of the Convention system.
JUDICIAL INNOVATION IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Judicial Innovation and Constitutionalism
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The European Convention on Human Rights provides that it is the Court that has the ultimate interpretive authority as regards its provisions and their meaning. 3 This interpretive power places the Court at the heart of the process of developing the Convention and elucidating on the precise nature of states' obligations under it. In developing the Convention, the Court has-perhaps inevitably-been innovative, especially in terms of guiding the Convention's evolution into a text and acquis with constitutionalist character within the European ordre public.
By judicial innovation we do not only mean (explicit and implicit) adoption and application of evolutive interpretation in the case law of the Court, but also the Court's approach to remedies, 4 interim measures, 5 procedure, and case management. 6 These innovations have equipped the Court to cope with an increasing number of cases as the number of people and states in relation to which it can adjudicate has increased. Indeed, without these kinds of innovations it is difficult to see how the Court could effectively function, particularly as its constitutionalist character has evolved.
Wildhaber claims that the Court is now firmly constitutionalist, a label that for him captures the following developments: the Court's development from a bulwark against totalitarianism to something more akin to a domestic constitutional court adjudicating on quotidian issues of rights enforcement, 7 its promotion of core constitutionalist values of democracy and human rights, and its use of constitutionalism as an analytical tool to 3 ECHR, Article 32(1). 4 For instance the ECtHR began to deploy Article 46 to place legal obligations on the state to introduce a reform focusing on a particular structural problem in the judgment. decline, indicated by the emergence of negative language to describe judicial innovation: in such circumstances 'development' becomes 'distortion', 'evolution' becomes 'activism'
(negatively understood), and the language of illegitimacy emerges.
B. Legitimacy Deficit as a By-product of Constitutionalism
Legitimacy is, of course, a complex concept, but for our purposes it can be described as respect and support for the Court emanating from stakeholders' confidence that the Court will decide cases consistently, in a manner that respects the nature of both the Convention (as a human rights instrument) and its jurisdiction (as subsidiary and limited), and by reference to appropriate materials considered within a methodologically sound framework. This conception of legitimacy is clearly connected to diffuse support for the Court, i.e. to the building of a favourable disposition towards the Court per se so that stakeholders will concede its authority even to make decisions with which they disagree. 12 To a large extent, however, whether or not someone considers that a decision or process adheres to these principles and is legitimate is bound up with their standpoint and desired outcome. The activist human rights campaigner might consider it wholly illegitimate for the Court to refuse to say, one way or another, whether there is a right to access an abortion in the absence of medical need under the Convention (for example), whereas a member state might say that the Convention purposefully fudges the matter (by the general nature of Article 2) and that it is a question of such moral disagreement that it is not for a subsidiary international human rights court to identify a minimum right by means of some kind of jurisprudential alchemy. In our view the danger that Judge Myjer refers to is properly seen as the cost of a reduction in diffuse support from contracting parties, which would hamper the Court in its attempts to be innovative in the development of the Convention so that it can act effectively as a constitutionalist instrument. We claim that the management of the Court's docket, being cognisant of non-legal factors, and the deployment of 'consensus' decision-making by the Court are all techniques deployed in order to effectively manage the tension that emerges from judicial innovation in the Court. It is to these that we now turn.
MANAGEMENT OF THE COURT'S DOCKET
All courts engage in docket management processes of some kind, and judges are often to the forefront of this in their making of threshold decisions as to whether or not a case is to be heard at all. It has long been accepted that the management of cases-or the management of the list or the docket-is not a neutral exercise but rather has the capacity to shape a Court's work in a substantive way. 27 This is perhaps especially so in systems where the court in question has a fairly sweeping capacity to decide on what it will hear, either through something like the selective jurisdiction of the US and UK Supreme Courts or, as in the case of the ECtHR, through the application of admissibility rules in a non-bureaucratic manner.
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In addition, the ECtHR has a further discretion which is as to whether or not to convene the Grand Chamber to hear a case and, in so doing, whether to facilitate a decision emanating from the most authoritative formation of the Court. In deciding on admissibility and on convening the Grand Chamber, the ECtHR is determining to some extent the canvas that it will paint on; it is deciding whether to take cases that are high risk from the perspective of judicial innovation. Docket management is, then, an important tool for the ECtHR in managing the tension between innovation and support.
A. Admissibility
The ECtHR has a wide-ranging set of admissibility rules, not only for the purposes of making its workload manageable but also in recognition of the Court's nature as a subsidiary court.
These range from what might appear to be relatively innocuous admissibility requirements (such as the requirement that the complaint not be anonymous, 29 or the six-month time limit 30 ) to those that are more akin to rules allowing proxy judgment on the merits (perhaps most notably the requirement that an application should not be manifestly ill-founded).
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Although sometimes classed as a merely bureaucratic process, Andrew Tickell has persuasively argued that the administration of these admissibility criteria by the Court is in fact often an exercise of substantive judgement. 32 This reflects the fact that, in applying its admissibility rules, the Court has always exercised a substantial amount of flexibility, even in 
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respect of what might appear to be the most straightforward of rules. 33 For example the Court was able to determine admissibility at least partially by reference to factors such as the perceived severity of the alleged violation which suggests its capacity to use admissibility as a management tool. Rules of admissibility can be disregarded if a constitutionalist issue is at stake. In Ilhan v Turkey, for instance, the ECtHR stated that 'the rules of admissibility must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. Regard must also be had to the object and purpose of those rules and of the Convention generally, which, as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, must be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective'. On the face of it, this appears to be a criterion that is intended to allow the Court to be more selective by filtering out less important cases (with importance being determined by using significance of disadvantage as a proxy), thus allowing it to focus on cases that might be said to have more potential for development of the Convention. 36 Whenever the question of significant disadvantage is considered by the Court 37 as a matter of admissibility an underlying claim is being made that reflects the tension that we are concerned with here. The implicit claim is either (i) that the disadvantage suffered is so significant that a refusal to hear the case when it is otherwise inadmissible would be unjustifiable on constitutionalist grounds, even if its resolution requires judicial innovation and (ii) that the disadvantage suffered is so insignificant (thus the case does not raise 'real' constitutionalist questions) that even compliance with the other admissibility grounds ought not to be sufficient for the Court--overburdened and in need of rationalising its workload as it is--to agree to hear it. innovative capacities are to be left for more 'significant' matters than these.
B. Hearing a Case in the Grand Chamber
Unlike admissibility criteria that protect the court from low importance claims but can be disregarded if there is a constitutionalist issue at stake, transfer of the case to the Grand
Chamber is a mechanism of highlighting legal disputes that are considered to be of particular importance by the Court. The Grand Chamber is the largest formation of the Court, Chambers of seven judges, 51 it arguably offers a more authoritative decision of an issue.
Third, the selection of cases is made according to their importance to human rights protection and to the interpretation of the Convention or when there is a possibility that a previous precedent of the Court will be overruled. 52 These criteria are broad and, as outlined above, the cases are selected by the judges exercising their discretionary powers. Thus, the selection of cases for the Grand Chamber seems to reflect what the judges think the truly important constitutionalist human rights issues in Europe are at the material time so that judicial innovation occurs in cases that the Court considers require its attention, in spite of the potential associated legitimacy costs. Fourth, the Grand Chamber tends to deliver no more than 30 judgments per year meaning that it is quite possible to keep track of these judgments 53 which are usually better covered in the media than the large number of decisions emanating from the Chambers.
Thus, the Court can emphasise a particular issue by promoting a case to the Grand Chamber level. Moreover, the Court executes control over the Grand Chamber docket and whether a case ends up in the Grand Chamber is not heavily dependent on the will of the parties involved but rather, we contend, on the Court's instinct as to whether a Grand Chamber decision developing the Convention jurisprudence on the matter at hand is sufficiently necessary and appropriate to bear the cost of opening up space for judicial innovation on the matter. 58 Interlaken Declaration, supra n 14 at para 9.
COGNISANCE OF NON-LEGAL FACTORS
In some, relatively limited, cases the Court appears to be willing to allow an apparent strength of feeling as to a particular issue to influence its decision as to the compatibility of the impugned state action with the Convention, often through the innovative development of pre-existing doctrines to allow for such views to be effectively considered. This is especially the case where the issue at hand is said to reflect an important element of national identity. 
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(domestic) consensus exists and can be verified within the respondent state that is sufficient to justify divergence from, and therefore trumps, the identified European consensus. 63 Where the Court receives an indication that a number of states across the Council of Europe are inclined towards a particular outcome in a case that is before it this can also act as a non-legal factor that influences the decision reached and acts as a brake on innovation.
Thus, multiple interventions 64 by contracting parties that present a united (or near united) front to the Court of the states' desired outcome can be influential. Take, for example, the judgment in Lautsi v Italy. 65 In this case the Court was called to decide whether the mandated display of crucifixes in Italian state schools violated religious freedom under Article 9. The
Chamber found a violation; a decision that was poorly received 66 and referred to the Grand Chamber. Ten states-almost a quarter of the membership of the Council of Europeintervened to argue that no violation ought to be found and the Grand Chamber overruled the Chamber's judgment. There had been, it held, no violation of Article 9. Of course, one cannot definitively claim that the mass of intervening states determined the outcome; nor is that our argument. However, it is too much to suggest that the mass of interveners did not indicate to the Court the disappointment with which a contrary finding would be received by these states so that judicial innovation might have been reined in. Indeed, the impact that third party submissions have on the Court's decision-making has been explored elsewhere. Petkova argues that 'at least in the area of qualified rights, it appears that the Court is more likely to establish or override its own precedents when transnational actors are also inclined to such 78 it also held that a declaration of violation was just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage so that compensation need not be paid by the respondent state found to be in violation.
B. Managing Sovereigntist Inclinations
While issues that go to a state's perceived identity bring about a reluctance to submit to international supervision on the part of states, matters that are seen to have existential 80 often in what were questionable circumstances, 81 it becomes at least arguable that this had more than a little to do with the fact that the government in Greece at the time comprised a military junta and that the Court is more trusting of such (ultimately political) determinations where they emanate from democratically elected governments. 82 Of course, the different treatment of Greece when compared to other states at the time has itself been identified as undermining the legitimacy of the Court by a number of scholars, 83 and if a wide-scale difference of treatment between states were to be clearly and publicly evident that would undoubtedly undermine the Court's legitimacy further. Although it is difficult to pinpoint analogous cases in contemporary jurisprudence, there are some interesting contrasts that can be identified between how different states seem to be treated.
Take, for example, engagement with different states in relation to the (regular or irregular) expulsion of suspected terrorists. The United Kingdom has long been engaged in an attempt to somehow recalibrate the non refoulement standard as applied in Chahal when it comes to security risks. 84 Although it did not succeed in having Chahal substantively revised through its intervention into Saadi v Italy, 85 the UK has engaged effectively in litigation to ensure that states can deport individuals to other states with questionable human rights records subject to diplomatic assurances or memoranda of understanding. 86 In spite of the fact that experts such as the UN's Special Rapporteur on Torture 87 have unequivocally condemned these assurances, the Court has continued to hold that deportation pursuant to such assurances is permissible provided a number of (not particularly onerous) standards are met in relation to them. 88 Once the relevant assurance is secured the suspect can be deported and, even if then subjected to torture or to an unfair trial, the sending state is not responsible.
Although (as the Abu Qatada saga illustrates) even this fairly minimal standard has sometimes frustrated the UK's efforts, it is as much as has been demanded by the Court.
Thus, the Court has not laid down absolute standards prohibiting the deportation of such suspects to states of this kind; rather it has accommodated the UK's desire for a deportationheavy approach to counter-terrorism, even in the absence of an Article 15 emergency.
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Similarly, the ECtHR has approved of closed materials proceedings in the security context provided only that the 'gist' (whatever that might be) of the case against the suspect This analysis may seem to set up a paradoxical claim: that the Court can 'use' the UK to set certain standards because it is a high reputation and high compliance state while at the same time being keen to exercise more self-restraint and not going too far in the cases against the UK. This simply reflects the fact that the subject matter and timing of a judgment can be important factors to be taken into account by the Court, as well as the nature of the respondent state.
As the UK is a high reputation state, the Court seems understandably anxious to keep it on board to ensure that it remains the pathway for certain judicial innovations. The 28 associated with handing down such judgments and allows for the development of a situation in which costs of non-compliance became high because an expectation would develop that judgments would be complied with. This is not to suggest that the UK or other high reputation states would inevitably comply, or would do so ungrudgingly, for this is subject to the third factor that must be borne in mind: the nature of the issue at hand. There will inevitably be issues on which a state holds such a particularly firm view that the risk of being innovative is especially significant, as we have seen above. In others, judicial innovation may seem a less costly exercise.
CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING
Consensus decision-making by the ECtHR is a further mechanism by which the Court manages judicial innovation, in this case by means of the interpretive approach it deploys.
This relates to the use by the Court of a determination of so-called 'consensus', often between member states but also sometimes on a more international level, as to a particular issue in order to determine whether or not the Convention can be interpreted as providing the protection claimed. 98 Consensus decision-making is a mechanism of managing judicial innovation when it is used by the Court in an attempt to reconcile evolution of the Thus, the consensus approach is incremental but also sometimes uneven; a point we return to below. However, as an approach to the interpretation of the Convention it clever allows the Court to both put into action the mandate from the preamble to the Convention to achieve greater unity between the Convention's members by the development of common understandings as rights, and enables a (sometimes tenuous) tethering of evolution to original consent. In this way, the legitimacy questions that arise from judicial innovation can be answered while constitutionalism is nurtured. If, as we suggest above, the Court sometimes takes cognisance of non-legal factors including the possible implications for its own position of taking an innovative approach to a question before it, it may well be susceptible to capture. In other words, there is a possibility that in either deciding whether to hear the case at all or in reaching its final decision on a case the Court may take into account contracting parties' reactions and allow this to influence the outcome unduly. Although this is and ought to be of concern, it is also part and parcel of the Court's subsidiary character. 114 Subsidiary courts are different, by their very nature, than are domestic apex courts; they step in to adjudicate in situations where the domestic systemwhich is the primary adjudicatory mechanism-has already dealt with a matter in some way.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MANAGING JUDICIAL INNOVATION
In this respect subsidiary courts have a limited jurisdiction and might be said to be expected to take states' reactions into account. This is due not only to the precarious nature of subsidiary courts and their reliance on states, but also the design of international courts. 
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largely to states themselves to determine. In many cases these marginalised issues, which might be read as being of lesser constitutionalist significance, lie squarely on the borderlines between personal, state and regional power, such as abortion. Thus, matters of reproductive autonomy are readable as being insignificant to the constitutionalist for they do not seem to merit the cost of progressive judicial innovation.
On our reading of the jurisprudence of the Court, then, uneven constitutionalism emerges at least partially from quasi-arithmetic assessments of cost in terms of diffuse support that are inherent to judicial self-restraint through the management of judicial innovation. While such assessments can be deployed to shore up support on the part of contracting parties, they have potentially opposite effects in the case of other stakeholders such as NGOs and rights bearers who may begin to lose faith in the Court's capacity and willingness to address the violation of their rights. Although it seems extremely unlikely that this would result in a significant reduction in cases brought to the Court for resolution, it may be the case that people who can do so will turn increasingly to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU for the resolution of rights violations where EU law is involved 116 so that the Court would find itself less frequently to the forefront of the development of the European public order.
CONCLUSIONS
Judicial innovation is crucial to the development of the European Convention on Human
Rights, but this does not mean that it does, can or must be present in every case upon which the Court adjudicates. Given the subsidiary and international nature of the Court, 116 In some jurisdictions it is arguably already more sensible to involve EU law instead of ECHR even in cases of human rights violations. Fontanelli points out that 'Italian judges are not allowed to set aside domestic acts colliding with the Constitution or the ECHR. constitutionalist development of the Convention through judicial innovation necessarily creeps in the European Court of Human Rights. Even then, the speed at which it creeps, the areas in which it occurs, and the reaction to same from contracting parties are all matters that must be taken into account by the Court when determining the extent to which to be innovative in any particular case. In this paper we have argued that some mechanisms of managing judicial innovation are, thus, required. We contend that in trying to engage in progressive constitutionalism while maintaining the diffuse support of contracting parties the ECtHR exercises judicial self-restraint by carefully managing its docket, being cognisant of non-legal factors of importance to and within the states, and selectively deploying consensus decision-making to determine the speed of change. This can, in some cases, mean that outcomes are reached that create an uneven constitutionalism and are somewhat unsatisfactory from the perspective of litigants and the human rights community, who tend to expect the Court to engage as fully as possible in the advancement and development of rights.
However, without a somewhat pragmatic and self-restrained approach, the negative consequences of judicial innovation and such constitutionalist urges may run the risk of undermining states' support for the Court and would, in turn, be detrimental to the Court in trying to maintain its effectiveness in rights protection on a broad scale. As a result, as outlined above, our claim is that the Court carefully manages judicial innovation through a nascent model of judicial self-restraint. 
